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Abstract
Contingent protection measures, such as Antidumping (AD) and Countervail-
ing (CV) duties, were originally intended to protect domestic producers from what
were considered to be “unfairly” cheap imports. However, due to the way in which
these policies are designed and implemented, they have been heavily criticised for
their greatly disruptive eﬀects on markets, and particularly on competition. This
paper contributes to the debate by studying the impact of US AD and CV duties on
domestic producers’ price-cost margins (PCM). Using a long panel of 4-digit indus-
tries, it ﬁnds evidence of a positive eﬀect of AD/CV duties on PCM. However, the
point estimates are small, especially compared to what has previously been found
for the EU. This is in line with the existent evidence of larger trade diversion in the
US with respect to EU. The analysis accounts for potential endogeneity in AD/CV
duties, as well as the intensity of the protection granted.
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11 Introduction
As traditional forms of import protection have been reduced following the GATT/WTO
negotiations, governments have turned to alternative means of restricting trade. Par-
ticularly relevant among these are contingent protection measures such as Antidumping
(AD) and Countervailing (CV) duties. Originally, AD/CV duties were conceived as in-
struments to protect domestic producers against competition from what was deemed as
“unfairly” cheap imports, either because foreign ﬁrms were “dumping” their products in
the domestic market in the case of AD, or because they were being subsidised in the case
of CV measures. However, given the way in which these policies are designed and imple-
mented, trade literature tends to view them today mostly as industry-policy tools aimed
at protecting domestic producers in the face of increasing import competition (Blonigen
and Prusa 2003; Konings and Vandenbussche 2005). For this reason, it is key to evaluate
their eﬀects on domestic markets, particularly on competition. This paper contributes
to the debate by studying the impact of AD/CV duties on domestic producers’ market
power. In particular, it analyses the changes in observable price-cost margins (PCM) in
industries where AD/CV duties are in place.
At ﬁrst glance, AD/CV duties are just another form of import tariﬀs. The eﬀect
of tariﬀs on domestic prices has been widely studied by trade theorist: import tariﬀs
increase domestic prices (Helpman and Krugman 1989). Under general assumptions,
in imperfectly competitive markets the same can be said about markups. A tariﬀ on
imports has an anticompetitive eﬀect on the market, which decreases the elasticity of
demand for the domestic product, allowing domestic ﬁrms to raise markups (Feenstra
2004). Therefore, we will expect to observe an increase in PCM following the imposition
of AD/CV duties.
However, there are opposing forces that can oﬀset these eﬀects. Firstly, unlike other
forms of trade restrictions, AD/CV duties are imposed against particular importing coun-
tries. Therefore, duties may lead not only to a switch between imports and domestic
production but also to trade diversion among import sources, limiting the ability of do-
mestic producers to increase markups. Moreover, even if duties allow for large increases
in domestic prices, eﬀects on markups may be smaller if suppliers of protected sectors
are able to capture part of these rents through increases in input prices (Pierce 2011).
Additionally, as is the case with any form of import restriction, the eﬀects of AD/CV
duties on competition depend on the degree of contestability of the import competing
industries. If the imposition of trade barriers increases entry by new domestic ﬁrms or
through FDI (tariﬀ jumping) this will also limit the ability of incumbent ﬁrms to raise
markups (Konings and Vandenbussche 2005).
This is not the ﬁrst attend to analyse empirically the impact of contingent protection
on market power. Previous studies have examined this phenomenon using a variety
of methods and data, but the evidence remains mixed. Nieberding (1999) is an early
reference providing some evidence of increased market power of protected ﬁrms. The
author tests the single diﬀerence change in PCM of 9 US ﬁrms involved in 4 AD petitions.
He ﬁnds that protected ﬁrms present higher market power after the imposition of AD
duties. Konings and Vandenbussche (2005) study the change in EU ﬁrms’ markups
receiving AD duty protection. They use a panel of ﬁrms operating in sectors that received
AD protection as well as a randomly drawn control group of ﬁrms in sectors not involved in
AD. They ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of AD duties on markups, but they ﬁnd no eﬀect for sectors
where an AD petition has been ﬁled but no duty has been levied. Blonigen, Liebman
2and Wilson (2007) study the impact of diﬀerent trade measures on market power in the
US steel industry using product data. In their study only voluntary restraint agreements
(quotas) increase markups, while the rest (mostly tariﬀs, including AD and CV duties)
have little eﬀect on market power. Finally, Pierce (2011) studies the impact of AD on
US plants using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach and US Census plant level data. He
ﬁnds that markups increase with the rate of protection but does not ﬁnd a statistically
signiﬁcant average eﬀect from the mere presence of AD duties.
The analysis presented in this paper diﬀers from previous studies in several ways.
Firstly, given the length of the panel, it considers all AD/CV petitions involving man-
ufacturing sectors in the US in a period of 15 years. Also, while most previous studies
focus on AD, here CV duties are taken into account as well. It is also important to point
out that the data used here is deﬁned at the 4-digit industry level. This means that what
is observed is the net eﬀect of AD/CV duties on the industry as a whole. This comprises
of both the direct eﬀect on the product concerned by the tariﬀ as well as the potential
indirect eﬀects on other products lines within the sector. By looking at the net eﬀect
rather than the direct eﬀect solely, it is possible to have an idea of how relevant these
policies are for the industries as a whole.
This paper uses information on AD/CV petitions ﬁled in the US between 1980 and
1994, coming from the Global Antidumping Database (Bown 2010). This period of
analysis is chosen since substantial changes were introduced to AD/CV laws both in 1979
and 1995. Markups are approximated by means of observed price-cost margins (PCM)
as discussed by Tybout (2003), using 4-digit-sector-level data from 383 manufacturing
industries, 91 of which received AD/CV protection in the period of study. An important
advantage of these industry data is that is annual, allowing the analysis of the changes
in markups in a more dynamic setting and the use econometric techniques that take
advantage of these dynamics. Alternative speciﬁcations are used to capture the intensity
of AD/CV protection, including the number of duties in place, the share of product lines
and trade ﬂows aﬀected, and the level of duties. To account for potential endogeneity in
AD/CV duties, two methods used, instrumental variables and propensity score matching.
The empirical analysis ﬁnds evidence of a positive eﬀect of AD/CV duties on PCM.
However, the low magnitude of the point estimates compared to the average industry
PCM, as well as estimates from previous studies using more disaggregated data, suggests
that the eﬀects of these policies are rather limited in the aggregate. The presence of
non-duty eﬀects is also tested for but results are not statistically signiﬁcant.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief description of US
legislation on AD and CV measures. The data and empirical methodology are described
in section 3. Section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes.
2 Overview of US legislation on Antidumping and Coun-
tervailing Duties
WTO rules allow member countries to use tariﬀs or quotas through two exceptions,
“escape clause” and “Antidumping and Countervailing duties”. In particular, AD/CV
measures are allowed under Article VI, which was incorporated into Title VII of US
Trade Laws.
According US legislation, for AD duties to be imposed two criteria must be met: 1) the
importing country must sell its product in the US market at “less than fair value”, which
3means it charges a lower price than in its own home market or that is less than average
cost of production; and 2) there must be “material injury” to the domestic industry, which
is deﬁned as “harm that is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant”.
Investigations are initiated following a request by domestic producers in the concerned
industry and are carried out by two independent institutions: International Trade Com-
mission (ITC) and the International Trade Administration of Department of Commerce
(DOC). The ITC determines whether there is “material injury” to the domestic ﬁrm, while
the DOC is in charge of establishing if the imported goods are sold in the US market by
“less than fair value”, and calculating the “dumping margin” and duties to be imposed.
The procedure is repeated in two phases of investigation, a preliminary ruling by both
institutions, where preliminary duties can be granted, and a ﬁnal decision. With the
exception of the preliminary ruling by the DOC, if a negative decision is taken by either
DOC or ITC, the case is terminated in both agencies. Apart from the two mentioned
outcomes (imposition of duties and termination of cases), AD petitions may have two
additional results. After an aﬃrmative ruling by DOC and ITC, and in order to avoid
the imposition of duties, foreign producers may agree to a suspension agreement. In
these cases, foreign ﬁrms consent to maintain a minimum price and limit their sales in
the domestic market. Also, cases may be withdrawn by the petitioner.
The procedure leading to CV measures is similar to AD, except that the DOC instead
of looking for dumping, evaluates whether the foreign country is subsidising its exporters.
Also, until 1995 no evidence of “material injury” was necessary if the country being
targeted had not signed the Tokyo Round’s Subsidy Agreement.
AD/CV laws were substantially modiﬁed by the Trade Act of 1979, and later amended
by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act in 1995, which among other things, established
“sunset reviews” to determine if AD/CV orders should be revoked after ﬁve years. To
avoid changes in the legislation aﬀecting the results, the period of study considered ranges
from 1980 to 1994. The Trade and Tariﬀ Act of 1984 also introduced several changes to
the law, such as “cumulation” of imports from diﬀerent sources in ITC’s material injury
determination. However, these amendments, while substantive, are not relevant for issues
studied here.
Figure 1 presents the evolution of the number of AD/CV petitions in the US between
1980 and 1995 involving manufacturing industries (97% of total petitions). There is a
sharp increase in the number of both AD and CV petitions from 1982 onwards, however
as the decade advances there is a clear tendency to prefer the use of AD to CV. The
share of petitions resulting in duties has increased also from 30% in 1980-1981 to 56% in
1994-1995 in the case of AD, and from 6% to 44% in the case of CV.
3 Methodology and data
3.1 Data
The industry data used in this paper comes from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry
Database (Bartelsman 1996)1. It contains sector-level data ranging from 1958 to 1996 on
output, sales, employment, payroll and other input costs, investment and capital stocks.
Industries are classiﬁed under 4-digit Standard Industry Classiﬁcation (SIC) version 1987.
Additional information on industry imports and exports was obtained from the U.S.
1A more detailed description of the data is presented in appendix B.
4Imports and Exports by 4-digit SIC Industry Database from NBER and The Center
for International Data at the University of California, Davis. It includes information on
value of imports, exports and industry shipments, ranging from 1958 to 1994 of industries
classiﬁed by their 1972 4-digit SIC code. A concordance table between the 1972 and 1987
versions, also available from NBER, was used to merge the two datasets.
The information on AD/CV petitions comes from Global Antidumping Database
(Bown 2010). For the particular case of the US, it provides detailed information on
AD/CV cases from 1979 to this day, including product descriptions, domestic and for-
eign ﬁrms involved in each case, relevant dates (initiation, decisions, imposition of duties,
revocations) as well as outcomes. Products are classiﬁed using the Tariﬀ Schedule for
The United States (TS) for cases initiated before 1989, and the Harmonized Commodity
Description and Coding System (HS) for petitions initiated after 1989. This study con-
siders all AD/CV cases ﬁled between 1980 and 1995 concerning manufacturing industries
(table 1). There are a total of 735 AD and 408 CV petitions, of which 292 (40%) and
127 (31%) respectively ended in the imposition of import tariﬀs.
At this point it should be clariﬁed what is meant by “case”. Domestic industries
seeking AD/CV protection may (and usually do) ﬁle petitions against various countries
in the same product. In these instances, separate investigations are initiated for each
named source. Although the impact of these countries’ imports can be “cumulated” in the
evaluation of material injury, dumping margins are calculated separately. In consequence,
outcomes may diﬀer and protection may be granted against one import source but not
others. Also, even when duties are levied against various sources, the rates of duties
usually diﬀers from one named country to the other. For that reason and following Sabry
(2000), in this study an AD/CV case or petition is a country-product pair. The same
applies when referring to the number of duties.
In order to merge AD/CV and manufacturing data, the relevant 4-digit industry
SIC code was assigned to each AD/CV case. This was done through a careful case-by-
case analysis using information on TS/HS codes reported in the AD/CV case, product
descriptions and information on ﬁrms2. Following Staiger et al. (1994), out of the original
459 4-digit industries, 73 are dropped out since they are excluded from concordance
tables. Three additional sectors were excluded due to missing values. The resulting
sample contains 383 sectors, including 139 involved in AD/CV petitions, of which 91
were granted AD/CV tariﬀ protection at least once between 1980 and 1994.
Table 1 presents a summary of the number of petitions by 2-digit SIC level. There is
a great concentration of AD/CV petitions and duties in metal sectors (SIC 33 and 34),
representing around 60% of total AD/CV activity. This will be taken into account in the
empirical analysis below.
3.2 Methodology to estimate markups and basic speciﬁcation
Markups are measured by means of observable price-cost margins (PCM). This method
is based on the Lerner index, and is calculated as follows:
PCMit =
pitqit   pMitMit   witLit
pitqit
(1)
where, pitqit are total sales, pMitMit are total expenditures on materials, and witLit
are total expenditures on labour. Assuming unit labour and material costs are linear on
2A detailed explanation of this procedure is presented in the data appendix.
5output; equation (1) is a monotonic transformation of the Lerner index.
There exist several methods to estimate markups all of which present advantages
and disadvantages. The choice among them depends on the nature of the data available
and the issue under study. The main advantage of using PCM is that it is directly
observable and it provides a separate measure for each observation, therefore allowing
for variations through time and between sectors. More sophisticated methods, such as
the one developed by Roeger (1995) for example, estimate markups as the coeﬃcient in
a regression providing a measure of the average markup across time and sectors, and
hence would not be appropriate for this study given the aggregated nature of the data at
hand. Additionally, by using PCM, it is possible to apply a panel diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
speciﬁcation, which allows to better isolate the eﬀect of AD/CV duties through the
comparison of protected sectors and non-protected sectors.
The main concern when using PCM is that it does not allow disentangling eﬀects on
markups from changes in productivity. Therefore, in order to better interpret the results
of this paper, it is important to have an idea of how productivity may be aﬀected in
the presence on AD/CV duties. As discussed by Pierce (2011), the eﬀect of contingent
protection on productivity is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand, an extensive body
of both theoretical and empirical literature has shown that trade liberalization has a
positive eﬀect on average productivity, either through intra-ﬁrm reallocations or with-
in ﬁrm productivity improvements3. In this sense, it would be expected that import
restrictions such as AD/CV duties would have an adverse impact on average productivity.
On the other hand, dynamic models studying the impact of trade policy on technology
adoption, have shown that import protection may accelerate the rate of adoption of pro-
tected ﬁrms increasing their productivity (Miyagiwa and Ohno 1995; Crowley 2006). In
fact, Konings and Vandenbussche (2008) ﬁnd that revenue based average productivity of
European ﬁrms improves moderately under AD protection. However, they also ﬁnd that
this increase is driven by low productivity ﬁrms that are able to reduce their productivity
gap, while high productivity ﬁrms experience productivity losses.
For the case of the US, Pierce (2011) ﬁnds that revenue based productivity of protected
plants increases with AD protection, but for a subsample of ﬁrms where he observes
quantities, he ﬁnds that physical productivity decreases. In view of these results, it is
safe to assume that potential increases in average industry PCM under AD/CV protection
will reﬂect to a greater extend changes in markups rather than productivity.
Following Tybout (2003) and Konings and Vandenbussche (2005), the basic speciﬁca-
tion estimated is give by:
PCMit = 1PCMit 1 + AD=CV Dit + Xit + i + t + it (2)
PCMit is the price-cost margin for sector i in year t as deﬁned in equation (1).
AD=CV Dit is a set of indicators of AD/CV protection. In the basic speciﬁcation it
measures the number of AD/CV duties in place in sector i in year t. Xit is a group
of control variables which includes capital intensity (measured as the ratio of capital
over sales), import penetration (imports divided by the sum of sales and net imports),
and industry level trade-weighted tariﬀ schedules (TWTS)4. i represents industry-ﬁxed
3This literature is too extensive to list here but it includes trade models with heterogeneous ﬁrms
following the seminar papers by Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2003), as well as a rich body of
empirical literature including Pavcnik (2002), Bernard et al. (2006a), among many others; and more
recently studies on the eﬀects of trade on multiproduct ﬁrms, most notably Bernard et al. (2006c).
4See the data appendix for a more detailed discussion on how these variables were constructed.
6eﬀects, t are time eﬀects (full set of year dummies) and it is the error term. Note that
given the inclusion of industry ﬁxed eﬀects and year dummies, equation (2) is a panel
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence speciﬁcation where sectors not protected by AD/CV duties are
functioning as counterfactual.
Given its dynamic structure, equation (2) is estimated using the system generalized
method-of-moments estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and
Bond (1998). This method controls for the presence of the unobserved individual eﬀect
i and the endogeneity in the lag of the dependent variables as well as other control vari-
ables. Results are robust to estimation using the ﬁrst diﬀerence generalized method-of-
moments estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), as well as the ﬁrst diﬀerence
two-stage-least-squares estimator proposed Anderson and Hsiao (1982). Results are also
maintained if instruments are “collapsed” as proposed by Roodman (2009). In all cases
the more eﬃcient two-step estimators is used and standard errors are calculated using
the Windmeijer (2005) ﬁnite sample correction.
3.3 Controlling for endogeneity
As explained in section 2, AD/CV duties are the result of a process in which ﬁrms
request import protection to the competent authorities, who grant it or not on the basis
of an investigation where market conditions are evaluated. Therefore, AD/CV duties are
not exogenously assigned, which implies that AD=CV Dit is potentially endogenous in
equation 2.
The sign of the endogeneity bias is a priori ambiguous. If a given sector is experiencing
increasing competiton or a downturn in its performance, this would normaly translate
in lower PCM. Additionally, these sectors may be more likely to ﬁle for protection and
get an aﬃrmative injury ruling by the ITA. This would imply that direct estimation of
equation (2) underestimates the eﬀect of AD/CV duties on PCM. On the other hand,
producers in sectors that are more concentrated may ﬁnd it easier to coordinate in order
to ﬁle an AD/CV petition and lobby for a positive ruling. At the same time, these pro-
ducers may enjoy higher market power and hence higher PCM. This does not constitute
a problem for ﬁrst diﬀerence estimations if the degree of concentration does not vary over
time. However, if PCM is increasing (decreasing), then estimation of equation (2) may
overestimate (underestimate) the eﬀect of AD/CV duties5.
In order to deal with the bias associated with selection, two alternative approaches
are used: instrumental variables and propensity score matching. The ﬁrst involves es-
timating (2) considering AD=ACV Dit as an endogenous variable and adding additional
instruments. These are employment, percentage change in employment and percentage
change in shipments, all lagged two periods, as well as the lags of AD=CV Dit. The
5A possible way of addressing this latter concern is to introduce an additional regressor that measures
concentration. The US Bureau of Census publishes series on various concentration indexes, including
the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index for 50 largest companies (HHI) and the share in shipments of the 4, 8,
20 and 50 largest companies. However, these indexes are calculated only every ﬁve years, which means
that for the period considered here only data for 82, 87 and 92 is available, and therefore, could not be
included in the estimation in ﬁrst diﬀerences. Nontheless, the inclusion of the lag dependent variable,
together with the pesence of industry ﬁxed-eﬀects, should greatly reduced any potential bias due to
omitted variables. Still, equation (2) was re-estimated using the concentration indexes in a ﬁve-year
diﬀerences speciﬁcation and a simple IV method instrumenting with 6-year lags. Although estimated
coeﬃcients were similar in sign and magnitude, they were not signiﬁcant. However, this was probably due
to the reduced number of observations (from 5736 to 656) as well as the use of a less eﬃcient estimator.
7choice of instruments is based on the analysis of the determinants of AD/CV petitions
discussed below. The second approach involves estimating the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
speciﬁcation in equation (2) on a reduced sample, where aﬀected sectors are compared
to a control group selected on the basis of a propensity score matching. The ﬁrst step
in this procedure is to estimate the propensity score, i.e. the probability that a given
sector receives AD/CV protection in a given year. This is done using two alternative
speciﬁcations. Firstly, following Konings and Vandenbussche (2008), a multinomial logit
model is estimated in which the dependent variable take three possible values: “1: no
AD/CV petitions ﬁled in the sector that year”, “2: one or more petitions were ﬁled in
the sector but none ended in tariﬀ protection”, and “3: one or more petitions were ﬁled
in the sector resulting in tariﬀ protection”.
However, this speciﬁcation is not completely satisfactory for our purposes since it does
not take into consideration the diﬀerent intensity of protection received by each sector.
In fact, not only may the presence of AD/CV duties be endogenous but also its intensity,
resulting in additional bias. For this reason, an alternative speciﬁcation is used where the
dependent variable takes diﬀerent values on the basis of the number of duties imposed
at a given point in time. More precisely, the new dependent variable takes ﬁve possible
values: “1: no AD/CV petitions ﬁled in the sector that year”, “2: one or more petitions
were ﬁled in the sector but none ended in tariﬀ protection”, “3: one petition was ﬁled in
the sector resulting in tariﬀ protection”, “4: two to four petitions were ﬁled resulting in
tariﬀ protection”, and “5: ﬁve or more petitions were ﬁled resulting in duties”. These cut-
oﬀs were selected on the basis of the distribution of the number of duties in the sample
as well as experimentation with diﬀerent cut-oﬀs, choosing the model that best ﬁt the
data. Given the clear ordered nature of this dependent variable, the model was estimated
using an ordered logit speciﬁcation.
The explanatory variables included in these models were selected following Blonigen
and Park (2004) and earlier literature on the determinants of AD/CV petitions and
duties6. These variables are the one period lags of import penetration and its square,
percentage change in shipments, employment, percentage change in employment, value
added per worker and its square, and PCM. They also include the number of AD/CV
petitions ﬁled in the industry in the three previous years7, US Real GDP growth rate
and a dummy variable for metal sectors (2-digit SIC codes 33 and 34).
4 Results
4.1 Determinants of AD/CV duties
Table 2 presents the results of estimating the logit models described in the previous
section. Columns (1) and (2) present the results for the second and third outcomes of
the multinomial logit, while column (3) presents results for the ordered logit. The base
outcome for the multinomial logit is “1: no AD/CV petitions ﬁled in the sector that
year” and therefore the coeﬃcients presented should be interpreted as representing the
comparison of the corresponding outcome to the no-petition case. Since signiﬁcance tests
6This includes Hansen (1990), Hansen and Prusa (1996) and (1997), Baldwin and Steagall (1994),
Sabry (2000), and Knetter and Prusa (2003). See Blonigen and Prusa (2003) for a review of this literature.
7Results do not change if this regressor is substituted by the number of petitions ﬁled in the sector in
the previous ﬁve years. In alternative speciﬁcations, the number of AD/CV duties imposed in the last
three and ﬁve years were also included as regressors but their coeﬃcient were non-signiﬁcant.
8are sensitive to the choice of base outcome, a joint Wald test was performed for each
variable to corroborate signiﬁcance when lifting the zero-coeﬃcient assumption for the
base category.
Most coeﬃcients present the expected sign and are consistent with the previous lit-
erature. The probability of both ﬁling and receiving protection increases with import
penetration and employment, while it decreases with the percentage change in shipment.
This latter ﬁnding reﬂects the fact that industries which are experiencing a downturn are
more likely to ask for protection and receive it. Also, past AD/CV activity is positively
correlated with the probability of ﬁling and receiving protection. As for the variable of
interest, PCM, its coeﬃcient is negative but not signiﬁcant which would imply that it is
not related to the probability of ﬁling and receiving protection. However, in the interest
of caution and since its p-value is close to 0.1, this variable is kept in the model used for
the matching procedure.
The models in table 2 provided the predicted probability that a sector receives AD/CV
protection in a given year (outcome “3” for the multinomial logit) or a given level of
AD/CV protection (outcomes “3” to “5” for the ordered logit). On the basis of the
propensity scores thus calculated, a nearest neighbour matching with replacement was
applied8 year by year. This resulted in control groups of sectors that had the closest
predicted probability of being protected but that were not9. Table 3 presents balancing
tests for the two alternative control groups. For all variables and both control groups,
the tests do not reject the null that the means of protected sectors and controls are equal
at 5%. This is also conﬁrmed by Hotteling’s joint test.
4.2 Basic speciﬁcation
Table 4 presents the results of estimating equation (2) using the system generalized
method-of-moments estimator (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998). Col-
umn (1) shows the estimation of the basic speciﬁcation on the complete sample. Re-
garding the variable of interest AD=CV Dit, results indicate the presence of a positive
and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of AD/CV duties on PCM. Yet, the coeﬃcient is rather
small: an additional AD=CV Dit tariﬀ increases PCM on average by around 0.085 per-
centage points, which represents 0.21% of the average PCM. However, usually more than
one AD/CV duty is in place in a given point in time. The average number of tariﬀs in
place (when AD/CV duties are present) is 3.29. A change from zero duties to this average
would imply an increase in PCM of 0.26 percentage points (0.7% of average PCM). This
is still a quite limited impact. For example, Konings and Vandenbussche (2005) ﬁnd an
increase in EU ﬁrms’ PCM of 4 percentage points following the imposition of AD duties.
One concern regarding these results is the fact that some industries are much heavier
users of AD/CV than others. As table 1 shows, Primary Metals (SIC 33) represent
almost 50% of the AD/CV duties imposed in the period. Moreover, considering also
petitions involving Fabricated Metal Products (SIC 34), metal industries alone represent
almost 60% of AD/CV ﬁlings and duties. In view of these numbers, it should be veriﬁed
8See Leuven and Sianesi (2003) for details on propensity score matching.
9The results presented here were obtained by considering a matched control group drawn from all
sectors that did not receive AD/CV protection, including those that were involved in petitions that did
not result in tariﬀs. The reason to do this is that it allows for better matches to the protected sectors.
A alternative matching was performed in which controls were drawn only from sectors not involved in
AD/CV petitions. Although the quality of the matching was lower, the main results and conclusions
were unaltered.
9whether these industries are driving the results. To this end, equation 2 is re-estimated
adding the interaction between AD=CV Dit and a dummy indicating whether the 4-digit
sector belongs to the 33 and 34 2-digit SIC groups (AD=CV Dit  metali). Results for
this alternative speciﬁcation are presented in column (2). The show that these sectors
are aﬀecting the coeﬃcient of AD=CV Dit downwards. In fact, the eﬀect of AD=CV Dit
is now of 0.18 percentage points for non-metal industries, implying an increase of 0.59
percentage points at the average of AD=CV Dit when tariﬀs are in place. Although it is
more than double the eﬀect found in the basic speciﬁcation, it is still fairly small10.
Column (3) presents the results when considering AD=CV Dit as endogenous in equa-
tion (2) and instrumenting for it (IV). The eﬀect is still positive and signiﬁcant but of
a much smaller magnitude than before. Results using the reduced sample of sectors on
the basis of the propensity score matching are presented in columns (4) and (5). The
estimated coeﬃcient for AD=CV Dit is again positive and signiﬁcant, and falls between
the basic and IV estimations.
4.3 Weighting by the share of the product codes aﬀected by the
duty
When analysing the eﬀects of AD/CV duties, especially when using industry aggregated
data, it is important to account for the intensity of protection. In the results presented in
the previous section, the intensity of protection was accounted for on one level, the number
of country-product pairs in which the sector is being protected. Another dimension in
which protection can diﬀer from one case to another is the relative importance of the
products aﬀected by the duty within the sector.
Ideally, this would require information on the relative share of the aﬀected products in
total production or sales of the 4-digit industry. However, since this data is not available
for the period considered, an alternative approximation is used which accounts for the
number of product lines the tariﬀs applies to and how this compares with the total number
of product lines belonging to the industry concerned. More precisely, cases are weighted
by the share of the number of TS/HS codes named in the AD/CV ﬁling relative to the
total number of TS/HS codes corresponding to a given 4-digit-SIC11 (AD=CV Dtshsit)12.
Table 5 shows the results of estimating equation (2) including the new variable. As
before, the ﬁrst column presents the basic results using the complete sample and the alter-
native estimation methods discussed above. In all cases the coeﬃcient of AD=CV Dtshsit
is positive and signiﬁcant and of a larger magnitude than in the previous section. Given
the way the AD=CV Dtshsit is constructed, interpretation of its coeﬃcient is less straight
10Another possible explanation for this result is that the relationship between the dependent variable
and AD=CV Dit is nonlinear. To check this, equation (2) was estimated introducing the square of the
corresponding AD/CV variable. This resulted in non-signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for the squares, while the
levels remained practically unchanged.
11This share can diﬀer greatly from one case to another. Firstly, some sectors comprise many more
product lines than others. For example, the number of trade codes (TS/HS) corresponding to a given
4-digit-SIC industry can vary between one and almost a thousand codes, with an average of around 40
product lines per sector. Also, the number of codes named in a given AD/CV petition is on average 12
codes, but can vary from one to over 64 for AD and from one to more than 500 for CV.
12To be consistent to what has been done so far and in order not to lose the country-product dimension,
cases involving diﬀerent countries in the same product line are still considered separately. In consequence,
AD=CV Dtshsit is not a share taking values between 0 and 1, it still corresponds to the sum of the number
of duties, except that now each unit is weighted by the share of codes aﬀected by the duty.
10forward. One possible way to interpret it is to say that if a new AD/CV duties were
imposed covering all product lines of a given sector, PCM would increase on average
approximately by 0.44 percentage points (1.78% of average PCM). More interesting is to
compare the eﬀects at diﬀerent values of AD=CV Dtshsit. At the average level of protec-
tion, the eﬀect is 0.21 percentage points (0.57% of average PCM). At the maximum of
AD=CV Dtshsit, however, PCM increases by 4.69 percentage points (12.51% of average
PCM). As before, changes in average industry PCM following the imposition of AD/CV
duties are rather small except for extremely high levels of protection.
Column (2) presents the results of interacting AD=CV Dtshsit with the metal indus-
tries dummy. As in section (4.2), the coeﬃcient of the AD/CV variable is positive and
signiﬁcant and of a slightly larger magnitude that in the basic speciﬁcation. Column
(3) present the results instrumenting for AD=CV Dtshsit, while estimations on the sub-
samples using the constructed control groups are presented in columns (4) and (5). The
estimated coeﬃcients for AD=CV Dtshsit are positive and signiﬁcant but of a slightly
smaller magnitude than before. They imply an increase in PCM at the average level of
protection of 0.09 to 0.17 percentage points (0.25% to 0.46% of average PCM), and of
2.08 to 3.83 percentage points (5.54% to 10.23% of average PCM) at the maximum.
4.4 Considering trade-weighted duties
The alternative speciﬁcations presented in the previous section aimed at accounting more
precisely for the intensity of AD/CV protection. However, this is not completely satis-
factory since some AD/CV duties may be aﬀecting greater trade ﬂows than others. Ad-
ditionally, AD/CV duties also diﬀer signiﬁcantly on the level of the duties imposed, an
element that has been neglected so far. This section presents an alternative measure of
AD/CV duties that accounts for these two elements.
To illustrate the ﬁrst issue, table 6 presents three measures of the relative importance
of imports aﬀected by AD/CV duties. They were calculated using import data of the
year before the initiation of the AD/CV petition. The ﬁrst part of the table presents the
share of the named country on total imports of the aﬀected good. This is a measure of
the importance of the targeted source in the market of the speciﬁc product. On average,
each country targeted by AD/CV duties represents around 20% of the import market
of the aﬀected product. However, the average hides much heterogeneity among cases,
with some having a very small participation while others represent almost a 100% of
imports in the product. It is important to bear in mind that table 6 presents separately
shares of diﬀerent countries. In a given moment a greater part of total imports of a
particular product may be aﬀected by AD/CV duties if simultaneous tariﬀs are levied
against diﬀerent sources.
The second ratio presented in table 6 is the share of the aﬀected product on total
imports competing with the 4-digit SIC industry. This share measures the importance
in terms of imports of the aﬀected product relative to other products of the industry.
On average, products named in an aﬃrmative AD/CV petition represent around 17% of
total imports of the industry, but this can vary between 0.01% and 100%.
Finally, these two ratios are combined obtaining the share of the imports from the
named country in the aﬀected product on total imports of the industry, that is, the share
of imports directly concerned on all imports competing with the 4-digit SIC industry. As
the last part of table 6 shows, aﬀected imports represent on average around 4% of total
imports of the industry, but ranging from almost zero to 90%.
11Regarding the level of the duties, table 7 presents descriptive statistics of AD/CV
duty levels using information form the Global Antidumping database on “all other ﬁrm”
duties (AD) and “all other” rates (CV). These are the duties payable by foreign exporters
from the targeted country who have not been named in the case. They are calculated
by DOC as the trade weighted average of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc duties levied against named
ﬁrms(Macrory et al. 1991; Gallaway et al. 1999). As table 7 shows, the level of duties can
vary a great deal from case to case, ranging from a mere 0.02% to almost 260%. Also,
AD duties are on average much higher than CV duties.
Import shares described above are used to calculate two versions of trade-weighted
duties. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, AD/CV duty levels are weighted by the share of imports
in the aﬀected product on total imports of the 4-digit SIC industry (TWDprodit); and in
the second, duties are weighted by the share of imports from the targeted country in the
aﬀected product on total imports of the sector TWDprod_ctyit.
Table 8 presents a summary of the results of estimating equation (2) using these
two measures alternatively. The coeﬃcients of both TWDprodit and TWDprod_ctyit are
positive and signiﬁcant. Results are similar when controlling for endogeneity of AD/CV
duties as presented in columns (4) to (8). These coeﬃcients are more diﬃcult to interpret
since they related to the eﬀect of trade weighted duties that can vary either because the
duty imposed is higher or because it is imposed against a country or in a product with
higher participation on imports. As an exercise, let us consider a change from zero to the
sample means of TWDprod and TWDprod_ctyit when tariﬀs are in place. The coeﬃcient
estimated in column (2), for example, implies an eﬀect is of 0.14 and 0.22 percentage
points respectively (0.054% and 0.082% of average PCM). At the maximum level of
TWDprod and TWDprod_ctyit, the estimated impact are 5.31 and 3.29 percentage points
(14.19% and 8.79% of average PCM).
4.5 Non-duty eﬀects of AD/CV petitions
The previous sections have analysed the eﬀects of AD/CV following the imposition of
import tariﬀs. However, AD/CV petitions may also have “non-duty eﬀects”. Staiger et
al. (1994) study this phenomena and identify three possible non-duty eﬀects: a “ﬁling
eﬀect” caused by the fact that a petition has been ﬁled before any decision is reached, a
“suspension eﬀect” for cases ended in a suspension agreement between the parties; and a
“withdrawal eﬀect” for cases that are withdrawn by petitioners before a decision is made
by the authorities.
In the case of AD, the presence of a ﬁling eﬀect is related to the fact that duties
are calculated on the basis of the dumping margin, usually the diﬀerence between the
price charged by the foreign ﬁrm in the US market and the prices charged in their home
market. Therefore, foreign producers may in fact reduce the level of the duties or even
eliminate them by increasing their prices during the period of the investigation. This
would lead to a drop in imports, restricting competition in the market and allowing
domestic producers to increase markups. An additional reason for ﬁnding a ﬁling eﬀect
in both AD and CVD petitions is the imposition of preliminary duties. As I discussed
in section 2, before reaching a ﬁnal decision, the DOC and ITA announce preliminary
rulings. If these are aﬃrmative, the targeted importer must make a cash deposit for each
entry equal to the preliminary margin determined by the DOC. This order stays in place
until a ﬁnal decision is reached (Gallaway et al. 1999).
Suspension agreements exist as an alternative to the imposition of tariﬀs in the case of
12aﬃrmative rulings. They are formal agreements negotiated between the DOC and foreign
ﬁrms named in the case, in which foreign producers agree to restrict import volumes and
to charge minimum prices. Their implementation is similar to that of a tariﬀ since
they are monitored and enforced by the DOC. Also like duties, they can be revoked.
Therefore, it would be expected to observe a similar eﬀect to those of a duty. However,
these agreements are accepted by foreign producers, presumably not only because of the
capture of tariﬀ rents, but also because they still allow some market access, which may
not be the case if the duty imposed is prohibitively high (Mastel 1998). In that sense,
the eﬀects of a suspension agreement on markups may be lower than that of a duty.
Finally, AD/CV petitions may be withdrawn by complainants before the ﬁnal deci-
sion, in which case the investigation is terminated. In these cases no duties or formal
agreements are put into place. However, withdrawals may be the result of collusive agree-
ments between domestic and foreign ﬁrms leading to quantity restrictions and higher
prices (Prusa 1992; Zanardi 2004). In this respect, it is important to recall that compa-
nies involved in AD/CV petitions are protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine from
prosecution under US antitrust law. Although direct conversations between parties re-
garding prices and quantities are not allowed, agreements can be negotiated through
government agencies.
Figure 2 presents the distribution of outcomes in AD/CV cases in manufacturing
industries between 1980 and 1994. Suspension agreements are quite rare, especially in
the case of AD. However, withdrawals are much more frequent representing 17% of total
petitions.
In order to test for the presence of these eﬀects, new regressor are introduced to
the the model in equation (2) including the number of AD/CV cases initiated in the
industry that year, the number of suspension agreements in place, and the number of
cases withdrawn, as well as interaction of these variables with AD=CV Dit. Two versions
are estimated, one simply counting the number of cases, and the second weighting each
case by the share of TS/HS codes concerned by the case on the total number of TS/HS
codes of the industry. Results are presented in table 9.
Most coeﬃcients associated with non-duty eﬀects are insigniﬁcant. One exception is
the interaction of AD=CV Dit and Initiationsit. This means that when duties are in
place, the initiation of new cases tends to increase average PCM further. A possible
explanation for this ﬁnding is that in sectors that have successfully obtained AD/CV
protection before, new initiations work as a signal that further duties may be imposed,
making foreign exporters react by restricting their export and hence pushing markups
up. Another exception is column (6) where withdrawal presents a surprisingly negative
eﬀect going against the previous intuition.
However, these results should be considered with caution for various reasons. Firstly,
AD/CV investigations take place generally within a few months; initiation, preliminary
and ﬁnal decisions may take place in the same year. This is not a problem in what
concerns duty eﬀects, since once imposed they stay in place for several years, but it
may aﬀect the possibility to picking up non-duty eﬀects using yearly data, especially
ﬁling eﬀects, which are more short lived 13. Also, for the particular case of suspension
agreements, given their rareness, it may be the case that this variable simply does not
have enough variability to pick up an eﬀect. More generally, non-duty eﬀects if present,
are possibly weaker than duty eﬀects, and hence may not be strong enough to be observed
13Using monthly product data, Staiger et al. (1994) and Krupp and Pollard (1996) ﬁnd evidence of
non-duty eﬀects.
13at the 4-digit industry level.
5 Conclusions
This paper studied the impact of AD/CV protection on domestic industries’ observable
price-cost margins (PCM) using US 4-digit sector level data. It used diﬀerent speciﬁca-
tions for AD/CV duties in order to account for the intensity of AD/CV protection, and
controlled for potential endogeneity in AD/CV duties through instrumental variables and
propensity score matching. It found evidence of a positive eﬀect of AD/CV duties on
domestic producers’ PCM. However, the point estimates are of a small magnitude sug-
gesting a limited eﬀect on sector level PCM, especially compared to what has been found
for the EU using ﬁrm level data.
There are many possible explanations for this ﬁnding. Firstly, trade restrictions may
have limited eﬀect on market power if foreign ﬁrms are able to “jump” these barriers by
moving production to the protected market through FDI. Interestingly, Belderbos (1997)
ﬁnds that AD protection increases the probability of FDI by Japanese electronic both in
the EU and in the US, but to a larger extend in the EU. Moreover, a study by Blonigen
(2002) covering US AD from 1980 to 1990 ﬁnds that the impact of AD on FDI is rather
limited and that “tariﬀ-jumping is only a realistic option for multinational ﬁrms from
industrialized countries”.
A more likely explanation is the diﬀerent degree of trade diversion present in the EU
and US. In fact, there is empirical literature that point in this direction. For the case of
the US, Prusa (1997), ﬁnds evidence of signiﬁcant trade diversion in the presence of AD
restrictions, to the extent that the overall level of trade continues to increase even when
imports from named sources decrease sharply. On the other hand, Konings et al. (2001)
ﬁnd trade diversion to be much more limited in the case of the EU. In view of these
results, it seems reasonable to assume that the diverse degree of trade diversion may be
playing a role in the smaller impact found on US producers’ PCM.
Another possibility is the fact that domestic producers may not be able to fully enjoy
the beneﬁts of protection if their suppliers are able to capture part of these rents through
increases in input prices. Pierce (2011) presents evidence that give some support to
this idea. In fact, he ﬁnds strong eﬀects on unit prices of protected product following
the imposition of AD duties, but a much smaller eﬀect on markups. In this sense, the
analysis of the upstream and downstream eﬀects of contingent protection constitutes an
interesting avenue for future research.
Finally, as was explained in the introduction, the results on this paper concern the
net eﬀect of AD/CV duties on industries considered as a whole, while AD/CV duties are
imposed in speciﬁc products. Sectors produce a range of products and the imposition
of an AD/CV duties on a given product line may have indirect eﬀects on other product
lines within the same sector. For example, if foreign producers perceive the duty as a
signal of protectionist tendencies with regard to that sector, they may choose to restrict
exports in other products in other to avoid future duties (Vandenbussche and Zanardi
(2010) present evidence that points in this direction). This would results in higher average
markups at the industry level. However, if foreign producers consider the probability of
being targeted with additional duties to be suﬃciently low, they may substitute sales
of targeted products with sales in other products, resulting in more competition in the
market in those products and therefore oﬀsetting the eﬀect on industry markups. The
14aggregated data used in this paper did not allow testing for such spillover eﬀects. However,
they constitute a promising area for future research.
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18A Appendix: Figures and tables
Figure 1: Number of US Antidumping and Countervailing petitions involving manufac-
turing industries between 1980 and 1995, classiﬁed by year of initiation.
Figure 2: Number of US Antidumping and Countervailing duties petitions involving
manufacturing industries between 1980 and 1994, classiﬁed by outcome.
19Table 1: Number of US Antidumping and Countervailing duties petitions involving manufacturing
industries between 1980 and 1994, classiﬁed by 2-digit SIC code.
Cases ﬁled Duties imposed
SIC Description AD CV % Total AD CV % Total
33 Primary Metal Industries 300 247 48% 121 83 49%
28 Chemical and Allied Products 109 29 12% 50 7 14%
34 Fabricated Metal Products 74 32 9% 34 7 10%
35 Industrial Machinery and Equipment 78 12 8% 35 4 9%
22 Textile Mill Products 19 19 3% 3 9 3%
32 Stone, Clay and Glass Products 26 11 3% 3 5 2%
20 Food and Kindred Products 16 18 3% 3 5 2%
36 Electronic and Other Electric Equipment 27 1 2% 18 0 4%
23 Apparel and Other Textile Products 13 11 2% 5 2 2%
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics Products 16 7 2% 7 2 2%
37 Transport Equipment 16 7 2% 3 1 1%
38 Instruments and Related Products 14 5 2% 3 0 1%
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 11 3 1% 4 1 1%
26 Paper and Allied Products 10 0 1% 0 0 0%
24 Lumber and Wood Products 0 5 0% 0 1 0%
27 Printing and Publishing 2 1 0% 2 0 0%
25 Furniture and Fixtures 2 0 0% 0 0 0%
29 Petroleum and Coal Products 2 0 0% 1 0 0%
735 408 292 127
20Table 2: Determinants of AD/CV petitions
Multinomial logita Ordered logitb
(1) (2) (3)
Outcome 2 Outcome 3
Import penetration lagged 0.114*** 0.0848*** 0.0967***
(0.0245) (0.0210) (0.0206)
Import penetration lagged and squared -0.00218*** -0.00120*** -0.00155***
(0.000614) (0.000403) (0.000444)
Percentage change in shipments lagged -0.0273*** -0.0350*** -0.0319***
(0.00885) (0.0107) (0.00710)
Employment lagged 0.00556*** 0.00503*** 0.00540***
(0.000875) (0.00128) (0.000974)
Percentage change in employment lagged 0.0181** 0.0206** 0.0202***
(0.00832) (0.00975) (0.00663)
V alue added per worker lagged 0.0266*** 0.0261*** 0.0273***
(0.00770) (0.00839) (0.00660)
V alue added per worker lagged and squared -0.00008** -0.00007* -0.00008***
(0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00003)
AD=CV petitions 3 previous years 0.0814** 0.106*** 0.0421*
(0.0414) (0.0399) (0.0220)
PCM lagged -0.987 -0.720 -0.874
(0.879) (1.024) (0.866)
Metal sectors dummy 0.545* 1.424*** 1.159***
(0.315) (0.305) (0.295)












Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Chi-squared statistic 387.0*** 254.8***
Pseudo-R2 0.12 0.10
Observations 6119 6119
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes statistically diﬀerent from zero at
1/5/10 % levels respectively.
a The dependent variable takes three possible values: “1: no AD/CV petitions ﬁled in the sector that
year”, “2: one or more petitions were ﬁled in the sector but none ended in tariﬀ protection”, and “3: one
or more petitions were ﬁled in the sector resulting in tariﬀ protection”. The omitted base outcome is “1”.
Joint signiﬁcance of each coeﬃcient in the three equations was conﬁrmed using the Wald tests.
b The dependent variable takes ﬁve possible values: “1: no AD/CV petitions ﬁled in the sector that year”,
“2: one or more petitions were ﬁled in the sector but none ended in tariﬀ protection”, “3: one petition
was ﬁled in the sector resulting in tariﬀ protection”, “4: two to four petitions were ﬁled resulting in tariﬀ
protection”, and “5: ﬁve or more petitions were ﬁled resulting in duties”.
21Table 3: Balancing tests
Control group from multinomial logit
Mean Test of mean equality
Treated Control group t-stat p-value
Import penetration (%) 15.44 15.03 0.28 0.78
Percentage change in shipments 2.40 2.08 0.25 0.80
Employment 64.45 61.07 -0.39 0.70
Percentage change in employment -2.20 -1.02 1.11 0.27
Value added per worker 70.90 80.68 1.84 0.07
Price cost margins 0.35 0.35 0.12 0.90
Number of observations 165 154
F-test p-value No. Of obs
Hotteling’s F-test 1.08 0.38 319
Control group from ordered logit
Mean Test of mean equality
Treated Control group t-stat p-value
Import penetration (%) 15.44 14.75 -0.51 0.61
Percentage change in shipments 2.40 1.91 -0.38 0.70
Employment 64.45 67.67 0.35 0.73
Percentage change in employment -2.20 -1.45 0.72 0.48
Value added per worker 70.90 70.76 -0.03 0.98
Price cost margins 0.35 0.36 0.57 0.57
Number of observations 165 156
F-test p-value No. Of obs
Hotteling’s F-test 0.25 0.96 321
Note: All variables refer to the year before initiation of AD/CV petitions as included in the multi-
nomial and ordered logit equations used to estimate the propensity scores.
Table 4: Impact of AD/CV duties on price-cost margins (PCM), basic speciﬁcation
Basica IVb Control 1c Control 2d
Dependent variable: PCM (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PCM lagged 0.743*** 0.740*** 0.794*** 0.779*** 0.787***
(0.0872) (0.122) (0.0792) (0.0983) (0.0964)
PCM lagged 2 periods 0.172** 0.0845 0.163** 0.102 0.0383
(0.0843) (0.111) (0.0751) (0.101) (0.0948)
AD=CV D 0.00085** 0.00182** 0.00026* 0.00049* 0.00053*
(0.00034) (0.00074) (0.00014) (0.00029) (0.00029)
AD=CV D  metal -0.00130*
(0.00077)
Capital intensity -0.00557 0.0219* 0.00140 -0.00678 -0.00860
(0.00475) (0.0125) (0.00384) (0.00570) (0.00654)
Import penetration -0.00693 -0.0114 -0.0127** -0.0118 0.00182
(0.00703) (0.0114) (0.00604) (0.0123) (0.0141)
TWTS 0.0195 0.0766 -0.000832 0.0556 0.0787**
(0.0179) (0.0638) (0.0190) (0.0386) (0.0400)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5736 5736 5736 2758 2953
Number of SIC 383 383 383 184 197
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.397 0.986 0.461 0.941 0.572
Sargan/Hansen test (p-value) 0.411 0.226 0.270 0.460 0.129
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) were calculated using Windmeijer ﬁnite sample correction.
***/**/* denotes statistically diﬀerent from zero at 1/5/10 % levels respectively.
a Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimations using as controls all sectors that did not receive AD/CV protection.
b Speciﬁcation instrumenting for AD=CV D.
c Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation using the control group selected on the basis of the multinomial logit.
d Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimations using the control group selected on the basis of the ordered probit.
22Table 5: Impact of AD/CV duties on price-cost margins (PCM), weighting cases by share of
aﬀected trade codes.
Basica IVb Control 1c Control 2d
Dependent variable: PCM (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PCM lagged 0.745*** 0.736*** 0.756*** 0.747*** 0.756***
(0.0863) (0.122) (0.0759) (0.105) (0.0848)
PCM lagged 2 periods 0.168** 0.0852 0.191*** 0.125 0.0604
(0.0833) (0.111) (0.0710) (0.105) (0.0853)
AD_CV Dtshs 0.00440*** 0.00598*** 0.00195* 0.00338*** 0.00360***
(0.000948) (0.00171) (0.00106) (0.00101) (0.00139)
AD_CV Dtshs  metal -0.00351
(0.00227)
Capital intensity -0.00503 0.0202 0.000688 -0.00634 -0.00774
(0.00473) (0.0124) (0.00391) (0.00568) (0.00670)
Import penetration -0.00640 -0.0110 -0.0143** -0.0124 0.00413
(0.00694) (0.0114) (0.00613) (0.0134) (0.0148)
TWTS 0.0212 0.0741 -0.00933 0.0723* 0.0847**
(0.0179) (0.0636) (0.0210) (0.0419) (0.0397)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5736 5736 5736 2758 2953
Number of SIC 383 383 383 184 197
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.418 0.995 0.255 0.901 0.705
Sargan/Hansen test (p-value) 0.397 0.216 0.222 0.721 0.227
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) were calculated using Windmeijer ﬁnite sample correction.
***/**/* denotes statistically diﬀerent from zero at 1/5/10 % levels respectively.
a Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimations using as controls all sectors that did not receive AD/CV protection.
b Speciﬁcation instrumenting for AD=CV D.
c Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation using the control group selected on the basis of the multinomial logit.
d Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimations using the control group selected on the basis of the ordered probit.
Table 6: Import shares of products aﬀected by AD/CV duties
Share of targeted country in imports of aﬀected product
Mean St.dv. Min. Max.
AD 25.22% 23.86% 0.02% 99.41%
CV 18.22% 23.91% 0.02% 98.57%
Both 23.26% 24.06% 0.02% 99.41%
Share of aﬀected product on total imports of the sector
Mean St.dv. Min. Max.
AD 17.59% 21.96% 0.01% 94.82%
CV 16.75% 24.42% 0.04% 100.00%
Both 17.35% 22.65% 0.01% 100.00%
Share of imports of aﬀected product from targeted country on
total imports of the sector
Mean St.dv. Min. Max.
AD 3.96 % 7.84 % 0.00 % 56.50 %
CV 4.30 % 13.81 % 0.00 % 89.97 %
Both 4.06 % 9.86 % 0.00 % 89.97 %
Notes: All shares are calculated using import values of the year before
initiation of the AD/CV petition.
23Table 7: Duty levels and trade weighted duties (in %)
“All other ﬁrms” duties
Mean St.dv. Min. Max.
AD 42.46 45.00 0.65 259.17
CV 12.12 15.37 0.02 112.34
Both 34.00 41.35 0.02 259.17
Duties weighted by share of aﬀected product on total imports
of the sector
Mean St.dv. Min. Max.
AD 7.16 15.27 0.00 131.06
CV 1.32 3.13 0.00 25.11
Both 5.53 13.33 0.00 131.06
Duties weighted by share of imports of aﬀected product from
targeted country on total imports of the sector
Mean St.dv. Min. Max.
AD 1.32 2.98 0.00 26.73
CV 0.35 1.79 0.00 18.45
Both 1.05 2.73 0.00 26.73
Notes: See main text for details on how these duties were calculated.
Table 8: Impact of AD/CV duties on price-cost margins (PCM), using trade weighted duties.
Basica IVb Control 1c Control 2d
Dependent variable: PCM (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TWDprod 0.00007*** 0.00007*** 0.00002* 0.00006*** 0.00006***
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00002)
TWDprod  metal -0.00009 -0.000173 -0.000238
(0.00016) (0.000205) (0.000206)
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.975 0.966 0.173 0.741 0.451
Sargan/Hansen test (p-value) 0.218 0.218 0.283 0.238 0.281
TWDprod_cty 0.000546** 0.000693*** 0.000183 0.000609** 0.000582**
(0.000268) (0.000263) (0.000137) (0.000287) (0.000277)
TWDprod_cty  metal -0.00140** -0.00149** -0.00168**
(0.000599) (0.000727) (0.000712)
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.975 0.982 0.138 0.769 0.488
Sargan/Hansen test (p-value) 0.220 0.218 0.316 0.241 0.277
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) were calculated using Windmeijer ﬁnite sample correction.
***/**/* denotes statistically diﬀerent from zero at 1/5/10 % levels respectively.
a Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimations using as controls all sectors that did not receive AD/CV protection.
b Speciﬁcation instrumenting for AD=CV D.
c Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation using the control group selected on the basis of the multinomial logit.
d Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimations using the control group selected on the basis of the ordered probit.
24Table 9: Non-duty eﬀects of AD/CV petitions on price-cost margins (PCM)
Basic speciﬁcation Weighting cases by share of TS/HS codesa
Dependent variable: PCM (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AD=CV D 0.000703* 0.000587 0.000710* 0.00498*** 0.00429*** 0.00440***
(0.000379) (0.000481) (0.000379) (0.00166) (0.000921) (0.000966)
Initiations -0.000228 0.000126
(0.000182) (0.000865)
AD=CV D  Initiations 0.000016* 0.000376***
(0.000009) (0.000130)
Suspension agreements -0.00180 0.0149
(0.00210) (0.0645)




AD=CV D  Withdrawals 0.00001 0.00124
(0.000033) (0.00814)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5736 5736 5736 5736 5736 5736
Number of SIC 383 383 383 383 383 383
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.409 0.408 0.411 0.406 0.428 0.403
Sargan/Hansen test (p-value) 0.416 0.432 0.426 0.395 0.377 0.396
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) were calculated using Windmeijer ﬁnite sample correction. ***/**/* denotes statistically dif-
ferent from zero at 1/5/10 % levels respectively.
a For these speciﬁcations, each regressor X listed refers to Xtshs
25B Appendix: data
B.1 Matching HS and TS trade codes to SIC industry codes
A sensitive issue in the construction of the database used in this paper is the correct iden-
tiﬁcation of the domestic import competing industry corresponding to each AD/CV pe-
tition. While industries are classiﬁed under the Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC),
products in AD/CV petitions are classiﬁed using trade codes - the Tariﬀ Schedule for
The United States (TS) for cases initiated before 1989, and the Harmonized Commodity
Description and Coding System (HS) for petitions initiated after 1989. Therefore, identi-
fying the relevant industry for AD/CV petitions requires merging this two classiﬁcations.
The starting point was concordance tables between the HS/TS and 4-digit SIC codes
obtained from Feenstra (1996) and Feenstra et al. (2002). However, trade codes cannot
always be assigned to a unique 4-digit SIC code due to the fact that industry classiﬁcations
are based both on product characteristics and production process, while trade codes
are based only on product characteristics. For this reason, concordance tables between
trade codes and SIC are constructed using import-based SIC codes, which assign all
the corresponding trade codes to one of the relevant industries, and leave out the rest.
For example, all codes referring to products produced by both SICs 3312 and 3317 are
assigned to 3312, while 3317 is excluded from the concordance table. One possible way
of dealing with this problem is to sum up data for these industries and consider them
as one larger industry. However, the match between excluded and included industries is
not always one to one, products from excluded industries may be bundled into various
other industries, and also products from many excluded industries are sometimes bundled
into one industry. Therefore, one may end up summing up several industries together.
Following Staiger et al. (1994), this problem is avoided by dropping out of the sample
those industries to which no TS/HS codes are assigned.
Additionally, AD/CV cases may map into more than one “non-excluded” industry
basically for two reasons: 1) the AD/CV case ﬁle reports various trade codes mapping
into diﬀerent industries; and 2) the reported codes are more aggregated than the 7-digit-
TS or 10-digit HS for which concordance tables are constructed, for example a 4-digit
trade code, which corresponds to various 7/10-digit codes mapping into diﬀerent sectors.
For these cases, a detailed case by case analysis was carried out on the basis of the
following criteria:
1. A comparison of the product description reported in the AD/CV case with the
descriptions of the SIC industry codes matched.
2. A comparison of the product description reported in the AD/CV case with the
descriptions of the reported TS/HS trade codes to select the relevant one.
3. Online information on petitioners and named ﬁrms.
4. An analysis of trade ﬂows to check which product lines had larger trade ﬂows and
for which the targeted country had a greater share.
The list of industries assigned to each case as well as an extensive report on this case-by-
case analysis is available from the author on request.
26B.2 Description of variables and data sources
The data used in this paper comes from three main sources:
(a) NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database (Bartelsman 1996). This dataset is
available at http://www.nber.org/nberces/nbprod96.htm.
(b) U.S. Imports and Exports by 4-digit SIC Industry Database from NBER and The
Center for International Data at the University of California, Davis (Feenstra 1996),
available at http://www.nber.org/pub/feenstra/.
(c) Global Antidumping database, version 3.0, June 2007, funded by the World Bank
and Brandeis University(Bown 2010). The latest version of the database is available
at http://econ.worldbank.org/ttbd/.
Industry variables. The following variables were calculated using industry data aggregated
at the 4-digit SIC classiﬁcation:
 Price-cost margins is calculated as indicated in equation (1) of the main text. The
series used were: total value of shipments (sales), total cost of materials, and total
payroll (labour costs). The three series were taken from dataset (a).
 Capital intensity is calculated as the ratio of total capital stock and sales from
source (a).
 Import penetration is the ratio of imports and total domestic sales (sales plus im-
ports minus exports). The series used were CIF import and export values from
source (b), and total value of shipment from (a). Since industries in (b) are clas-
siﬁed using the 1972 SIC classiﬁcation, a concordance table available from (a) was
used to transform the series into the 1987 SIC classiﬁcation.
 Trade weighted tariﬀ schedules (TWTS) obtained from Bernard et al. (2006b) and
available at http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/pks4/sub_international.htm.
 Employment is total employment obtained from source (a).
 Value added per worker is total value added divided by total employment. Both
series were obtained from source(a).
Macroeconomic variables.
 US Real GDP growth rate is growth Rate of Real GDP per capita (Constant Prices:
Chain series) from Penn Tables, University of Pennsylvania.
AD/CV variables. The following measures of AD and CV activity were calculated using
information on AD and CV petitions from source (c). The relevant SIC industry for
AD/CV petition was determined as indicated in the ﬁrst part of this appendix.
 AD=CV D is the number of AD and CV duties in place in the 4-digit SIC industry.
A duty was considered as being in place from the year of its imposition to the year
before its revocation.
27 AD=CV Dtshs is calculated as the weighted sum of the number of AD/CV duties
in place in the 4-digit SIC industry, where each duty is weighted by the number of
TS/HS trade codes reported for the case divided by the number of TS/HS codes
corresponding to the industry. The number of TS/HS codes reported for each
case comes from source (c), while the number of TS/HS codes for each 4-digit SIC
industry was taken from the concordance tables obtained from Feenstra (1996) and
Feenstra et al. (2002). Until 1988, the US used TS coding which is disaggregated up
to 7-digit, while from 1989 onwards the HS classiﬁcation was adopted going up to
10-digit. This posed a problem in the comparison of the two coding systems since
10-digits HS codes are in general more detailed than 7-digit TS codes, with the
consequence that the number of 10-digit HS codes assigned to each 4-digit sector is
much larger. For this reason, 8-digit HS codes were used instead, which are more
comparable to the 7-digit TS classiﬁcation.
 Trade weighted duties. Two versions of this variable were calculated:
1. TWDprod is calculated as the weighted sum of duty levels of all AD/CV duties
in place in the 4-digit SIC industry, where weights are given by the share of
imports of the aﬀected product on total imports competing with the 4-digit
SIC industry
2. TWDprod_cty is the same as 1., except that now duties are weighted by the
share of imports from the targeted country in the aﬀected product on total
imports competing with the industry.
Information on duty levels is obtained from “all other ﬁrm” duties (AD) and “all
other” rates (CV) reported in source (c). All AD/CV duties in the sample used
here correspond to ad valorem tariﬀs, except three CV duties in which speciﬁc
tariﬀs were imposed. For these cases the equivalent ad valorem tariﬀ was cal-
culated as the speciﬁc tariﬀ divided by the average unit value, using imports of
the targeted country in the aﬀected product one year prior to the initiation of
the case. Product level imports are the CIF value of imports of the year before
initiation of the AD/CV petition, coming from U.S. Import and Export Data
of the Center of International Data, University of California, Davis (available at
http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/data/sasstata/usiss.html). Since AD/CV petitions re-
port sometimes TS/HS at greater level of aggregation, a detailed case by case
analysis was performed to determine for each case which were the relevant 7-digit
TS or 10-digit HS codes according to the product description reported for the case.
 Suspension agreements is the number of AD/CV suspension agreements in place in
the 4-digit SIC industry. A suspension agreement was considered as being in place
from the year of its imposition to the year before its revocation.
 Withdrawals is the number of cases withdrawn in the 4-digit SIC industry in that
particular year.
 Initiations is the number of AD/CV cases initiated in the 4-digit SIC industry in
that particular year.
Like with AD=CV D, for these last three variables two versions were considered,
one where cases were simply counted, and another where each case was weighted
28by the number of TS/HS trade codes reported for the case divided by the number
of TS/HS codes corresponding to each industry.
Table B.1 presents summary statistics of all variables used in the analysis.
Table B.1: Summary statistics
Complete sample
Variable Mean St.dv. Min. Max.
Price   cost margins (PCM) 0.375 0.114 0.022 0.806
Capital Intensity 0.492 0.292 0.057 2.424
Import Penetration 0.147 0.163 0.000 1.850
TWTS 0.055 0.052 0.000 0.442
Percentage change in shipments 4.775 11.528 -53.746 92.759
Employment (in thousands) 40.235 55.504 0.500 473.200
Percentage change in employment -1.101 9.481 -55.224 150.980
V alue added per worker 70.433 56.740 10.230 976.453
AD_CV D 0.419 2.392 0.000 77.000
AD_CV Dtshs 0.061 0.460 0.000 10.647
TWDprod 2.621 26.397 0.000 759.621
TWDprod_cty 0.508 3.354 0.000 59.880
Initiations 0.204 2.404 0.000 126.000
Suspension agreements 0.060 0.496 0.000 11.000
Withdrawals 0.038 1.060 0.000 64.000
Initiationstshs 0.029 0.429 0.000 18.611
Suspension agreementstshs 0.006 0.062 0.000 1.000
Withdrawalstshs 0.003 0.107 0.000 7.500
Number of observations 5736
Number of industries 383
Protected sectors
Variable Mean St.dv. Min. Max.
Price-cost margins (PCM) 0.364 0.110 0.074 0.705
Capital Intensity 0.611 0.326 0.107 2.195
Import Penetration 0.176 0.164 0.002 1.145
TWTS 0.052 0.045 0.000 0.272
Percentage change in shipments 4.359 11.412 -53.746 52.415
Employment (in thousands) 50.085 54.874 1.700 454.900
Percentage change in employment -1.694 8.197 -49.123 52.273
V alue added per worker 72.342 44.331 12.600 314.571
AD_CV D 1.764 4.660 0.000 77.000
AD_CV Dtshs 0.258 0.917 0.000 10.647
TWDprod 11.028 53.304 0.000 759.621
TWDprod_cty 2.136 6.624 0.000 59.880
Initiations 0.766 4.853 0.000 126.000
Suspension agreements 0.216 0.983 0.000 11.000
Withdrawals 0.138 2.115 0.000 64.000
Initiationstshs 0.093 0.808 0.000 18.611
Suspension agreementstshs 0.017 0.106 0.000 1.000
Withdrawalstshs 0.006 0.056 0.000 1.135
Number of observations 1363
Number of industries 91
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